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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. N A T m  OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a September 30,2002, automobile accident caused by an uninsured 
driver. Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah") was, at that time, a minor child of Leslie and Linda Weinstein and 
was injured in the accident. At the time of the collision, Leslie and Linda Weinstein had a policy of 
insurance through Prudential Casualty and Property Insurance company,' which policy included 
Medical Payments ("MedPay") coverage and Uninsured Motorist ("UM") Coverage. The Weinsteins 
received MedPay benefits until that coverage was exhausted. About the time MedPay benefits were 
exhausted, Plaintiffs/Respondents began seeking benefits under the UM coverage. After revoking 
Defendants' authority to independently request medical records, the Weinsteins' attorney delayed 
delivery of any medical records to support the Weinsteins' claims for months, then almost 
immediately filed suit against the Defendants for breach of contract and the tort of bad faith due to 
an alleged failure to timely adjust the Weinsteins' claims. 
11. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The initial complaint in this matter was filed July 7,2004. An Amended Complaint was filed 
May 13,2005 and a Second Amended Complaint was filed in December 2005. The Plaintiffs' Third 
Amended Complaint was filed on May 2, 2007. At a May 2, 2007 hearing, the court granted 
Plaintiffs' outstanding motion to amend for punitive damages, and a Fourth Amended Complaint 
was filed that same day. A jury trial was held in late September 2007, and a verdict was entered on 
October 1, 2007. The jury found there was no bad faith as to the claims handling of the MedPay 
benefits and did not award any damages in that regard. The jury found that there was a breach of 
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contract and bad faith as to the UM coverage, and awarded Linda and Leslie Weinstein $210,000 in 
compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Sarah Weinstein 
$250,000 for her alleged injuries and damages due to the September 30,2002 accident. Because of 
offsets for prior insurance payments, an amended judgment was entered on December 7,2007, in 
favor of Sarah Weinstein for $182,225.48 in damages. Sarah was also awarded $84,150.00 in 
attorney's fees, and $2,958.15 in costs. Leslie and Linda Weinstein's judgment for $6,210,000 was 
entered on October 1, 2007. On January 23, 2008, the court issued its decision and order on the 
Defendants' motion for remittitur, ordering that Plaintiffs either accept a punitive damage award of 
$1.89 million or accept a new trial as to punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs have not appealed the jury's failure to award damages as to the MedPay claims 
handling. 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This matter arises out of a multiple vehicle collision that occurred on September 30, 
2002 near Capital High School. See R. 392-405, Ex. 10001; Tr. (9119107) pp. 557-558 (Mrs. 
- -- -. - - . -- ..- 
Weinstein's account of the collision). At that time, the uninsured driver (Ms. Harden) pulled her 
vehicle from a parking lot into the westbound lane of Goddard Road and collided with a vehicle 
owned by Brent Ho and driven by Ransom Kaya, which in turn crossed into the east-bound lane of 
Goddad Road and collided with the vehicle driven by Linda Weinstein (sometimes hereinafter, 
"Mrs. Weinstein"). Id.; R. 392-405, Ex. 10023 (notes of discussion with Mr. Kaya's insurer). See 
also Tr. (9121107), p. 831, L. 19 - p. 832, L. 10. Sarah Weinstein was a passenger in her mother's 
vehicle. See R. 392-405, Ex. 10001. Coincidentally, that same day, Plaintiffs' sold some property, 
1 P~dential  Casually and Property Insurance Company was purchased by LM Property and Casualty 
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2. Leslie and Linda Weinstein had an insurance policy with Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter, "Prudential") that included $5,000 in MedPay coverage 
and UM coverage of $250,000 per person.2 R. 392-405, Ex. 10000-8. The Weinsteins also had 
personal health insurance. MedPay coverage provided benefits through July 3 1,2003, when it was 
exhausted. See R. 384, Ex. 72. Standard insurance company practice for UM claims was that a claim 
would be presented by the insured for evaluation and payment. Tr. (9121107) p. 843, L1. 16-17. The 
evaluation would be based on receipt of all the medical records and bills and anything else submitted 
by the insured related to the injury claim, so that the company would review the claim as a whole 
and had a total picture of what was involved in the claim. Tr. (9121107) p. 843, Ll. 20-24. 
3. Prudential was notified about the collision on October 1, 2002. R. 392-405, Ex. 
10003. Prudential immediately began investigating the collision to determine the facts. See e.g., R. 
392-405, Ex. 10005 (Oct. 1, 2002 call to witness); Id., Ex. 10017 (Oct. 2, 2002 request for the 
accident report); Id., Ex. 10020 (Oct. 14,2002 call to witness concerning possible liability of Mr. 
Kaya). 
4. On October 2,2002, the UM adjuster, Vickie Kempczenski ("Vickie"), spoke with 
Mrs. Weinstein about the accident and learned that Sarah had suffered what appeared to be minor 
injurie~.~ Tr. (9121107) p. 821, L1. 3-14; R. 392-405, Ex. 10015. Vickie discussed with Mrs. 
Weinstein the various coverages available (collision, MedPay and UM) and noted that it was 
Insurance Company in November 2003. 
2 Medical payments coverage is similar to health insurance coverage in that it is merely designed to pay 
medical bills (albeit, those arising out of auto accidents); UM coverage is intended to take the place of insurance 
coverage a tortfeasor should have had. Revised Tr. (9125107) p. 59 L. 8 - p. 60 L. 6. 
3 Linda Weinstein also claimed she was injured, but never pursued a claim. 
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unknown whether additional treatment would be n e c e s s a ~ ~ . ~ ~ r .  (9121107) p. 821, L. 15 -p. 822, L. 
18; R. 392-405, Ex. 10015. Vickie discussed with Mrs. Weinstein the need for Prudential to gather 
information and asked Mrs. Weinstein to keep her (Vickie) informed as to treatment, changes in 
condition, and to call when she was ready to discuss a settlement. Tr. (9121107) p. 822, L. 23 - p. 
823, L. 14; R. 392-405, Ex. 10015. See also Tr. (9124107) p. 450 L. 9-p. 452 L. 5 (explanation from 
another adjuster that same process was standard). Vickie then ordered a copy of the police report and 
opened a UM file. Tr. (9121107) p. 824, L. 23 - p. 823, L. 14. 
5. On October 14,2002, Mrs. Weinstein contacted Prudential and indicated that she was 
being represented by legal counsel, but refused to provide the name of the attorney. Tr. (9121107) p. 
826, Ll. 9-21; R. 392-405, Ex. 10018. See also Tr. (9119107) p. 578, L1. 4-15 (Mrs. Weinstein 
confirming she retained attorney immediately). Prudential asked Mrs. Weinstein to have her attorney 
send a letter of representation (but never received one). Tr. (9121107) p. 826, L1.9-21; R. 392-405, 
Ex. 10018. Prudential's protocol was that once an insured retained an attorney, the insurance 
adjusters could not initiate contact with the insured without the attorney's permission. Id. Thus, 
Vickie could not contact Mrs. Weinstein directly. Tr. (9121107) p. 827, L. 21 -p. 828, L. 4. Seealso 
Tr. (9120107) p. 678 L1. 6-10 (Plaintiffs' expert agreed insurance company should deal with 
attorney). Because of privacy laws, Vickie could not review the Weinsteins' MedPay file. Tr. 
4 On October 1,2002, the MedPay adjuster (Pat Doyle) sent the weikteins two letters. The first advised 
the Weinsteins of their MedPay coverage, requested that they contact her immediately if they are contacted or billed by 
providers, and asked the Weinsteins to sign a medical records release. R 392-405, Exhibit 10012. The second letter 
advised the Weinsteins that the MedPay coverage included a "Coordination of Benefits" clause, which meant that the 
MedPay coverage would pay those medical expenses not paid by the Weinsteins' health insurance. See R 392-405, 
Exhibit 10013. The Coordination of Benefits clause would have been applicable to a named insured, such as Mrs. 
Weinstein, but was mistakenly applied to Sarah Weinstein, who was not a named insured. As noted above, the jury found 
no bad faith on the part of the Defendants as to this error, and declined to award any damages. Also, as noted, Plaintiffs 
have not appealed that result. 
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6. Mrs. Weinstein next contacted Vickie on November 11,2002. Tr. (9121107) p. 830, L. 
24 - p. 83 1, L. 18. They discussed the accident, and Mrs. Weinstein said Mr. Kaya-an insured 
driver-caused it. Id. If Mr. Kaya, who was insured, had been at fault, Plaintiffs would not have 
been entitled to UM coverage and Prudential could have closed the file. See Tr. (9121107), p. 832, L. 
22 - p. 833, L. 17. However, Vickie did not agree with Mrs. Weinstein and kept the UM file open. 
Id. Vickie also learned that Sarah's condition had not resolved and she was still receiving treatment. 
Tr. (9/21/07), p. 833, L. 25 - p. 834, L. 4. Therefore Vickie sent a medical records release form 
(medical authorization) to Mrs. Weinstein so she (Vickie) could order medical records when the 
Weinsteins were ready to settle.' Tr. (9121107) p. 834, L. 12 - p. 835, L. 9. There was no indication 
at that time that Sarah would eventually undergo surgery. Tr. (9121107) p. 835, L1. 10-13. At that 
time, Plaintiffs' MedPay coverage was still providing benefits. See Tr. (9121107) p. 865 L. 22 - p. 
866 L. 5; Tr. (9124107) p. 475, L1. 15-20 (MedPay paid bills through July 2003, at which point 
MedPay coverage was exhausted). 
7. On April 8,2003, Mrs. Weinstein contacted Vickie's supervisor, Ken Bensinger, to 
provide an update as to Sarah's treatment. See Tr. (9121107) p. 911, Ll. 14-20; R. 392-405, Ex. 
10067. She said Sarah was going to undergo an MRI and might need surgery. Tr. (9121107) p. 91 1, 
L. 23 - p. 912, L. 2. At that time, Plaintiffs' MedPay coverage was still providing benefits. See Tr. 
(9121107) p. 865 L. 22 - p. 866 L. 5; Tr. (9124107) p. 475, L1. 15-20. 
8. On May 12,2003, Vickie called Mrs. Weinstein to learn about the results of the MRI. 
See Tr. (9121107) p. 840, Ll. 2 - 19. Mrs. Weinstein told Vickie about the MRI, that Sarah was 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 5 
y for six to nine 
months. Id. Mrs. Weinstein also indicated that Sarah had not been able to play soccer since the 
accident. Tr. (9121107) p. 840, L1.23-25. (As the Defendants later learned, this was not true; instead 
Sarah had returned to playing soccer after the accident and thereafter experienced increased 
symptoms). See R. 392-405, Exhibits 101 17 (p. PRU 721) and 10127. See also Tr. (9119107) p. 397 
L. 15 - p. 398, L. 14 (Dr. Shea's testimony); Id., p. 529 L. 19 -p. 530 L. 21 (Sarah tried soccer in 
both the following fall and spring); Id., p. 549 L. 17 - p. 550 L. 4 (Sarah testified she returned to 
playing soccer without problems); Tr. (9124107) p. 427, L1.14-22 (medical records indicated playing 
soccer without pain). Mrs. Weinstein did not ask Vickie to pay any of the medical hills. Tr. (9121107) 
p. 841, L. 23 - p. 842, L. 1. At that time, Plaintiffs' MedPay coverage was still providing benefits. 
See Tr. (9121107) p. 865 L. 22 - p. 866 L. 5; Tr. (9124107) p. 475, Ll. 15-20. 
9. Mrs. Weinstein next contacted Vickie on September 2,2003. Tr. (912 1/07) p. 842, Ll. 
2-1 8. Mrs. Weinstein purported to be upset, asserting that neither MedPay nor the Weinsteins' health 
insurer were paying the medical bills, and claiming that creditors were calling her. Tr. (9121107) p. 
842, L. 19 - p. 843, L. 3. She demanded the medical hills be immediately paid under the UM 
coverage. See R. 392-405, Ex. 10079. Vickie had never had an insured make a demand like that 
before. Tr. (9121107) p. 844, L1.9 - 21. See also Tr. (9124107) p. 456 L. 21 - p. 457 L. 10 (another 
adjuster, Dorothy Quinn also noted the unique nature of request). Vickie explained the normal 
practice for receiving and evaluating claims, hut Mrs. Weinstein said she was not going to wait. Tr. 
(9/21/07) p. 845, L1. 1-17. Vickie told Mrs. Weinstein she would begin gathering the information, 
5 The medical authorization was sent out on November 11,2002. The Weinsteins returned it sometime 
aRer December 5,2002. Tr. (9121107) p. 837, LI. 15-20. 
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but because of a change in law (i.e., HIPAA)," Vickie would need a new authorization from Mrs. 
Weinstein. Id. See also Tr. (9121/07), p. 846, L1. 17-21. Vickie also asked Mrs. Weinstein to send an 
updated list of health providers and copies of anything the Weinsteins had. Tr. (9121107) p. 846 L. 22 
- p. 847 L. 4. Vickie faxed the HIPAA compliant medical authorization to Mrs. Weinstein 
immediately. Tr. (9121107) p. 847 L. 5 -p. 848 L. 11. However, although Mrs. Weinstein faxed the 
medical authorization back to Vickie the same day, she did not provide a list of Sarah's medical 
providers. Id. Despite another call from Vickie on September 2,2003, Id., Mrs. Weinstein did not 
provide a list of medical providers until September 25,2003. Tr. (9121107) p. 850 L. 15 - p. 851 L. 
10. Yet even then Mrs. Weinstein had not provided any medical records or other materials. Id. 
10. Before Vickie was able to request records from Sarah's medical providers, Prudential 
received a letter from the Weinsteins' attorney, Bruce Bistline. Tr. (9121107) p. 851 L1. 14-22. As 
Vickie explained: 
[The appearance of an attorney] completely changes the handling of 
the claim. When someone hires an attorney, then their attorney is in 
charge. I don't go behind their back and do things without their 
knowledge andlor their permission. So I needed to talk to him to get 
his permission to use that authorization at that point. 
Tr. (9121107) p. 852 L1. 4-10. Thus, Vickie needed Mr. Bistline's permission to proceed with 
ordering Sarah's medical records. Tr. (9121107) p. 854 L1.10-17. See also Tr. (9121107) p. 860, L1.9- 
14 (typical for the insured's attorney to control flow of medical information to the company). 
11. Vickie attempted to contact Mr. Bistline on October 10, 2003 and left a message 
asking him to call. Tr. (9121107) p. 852 L. 25 - p. 853 L. 16. Mr. Bistline did not return her call, see 
6 Most entities were required to begin complying with the HIPAA health information privacy rules on 
April 14,2003. See "Administrative Simplification Under HIPAA: National Standards for Transactions, Privacy 
and Security" (available at: http:llwww.hhs.govlnews/press/2002pres/h). 
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letter to Mr. Bistline requesting medical and wage loss 
information. Tr. (9121107) p. 853 L. 22 - p. 854 L. 9; R. 392-405, Ex. 10089. When she still had not 
heard from Mr. Bistline, Vickie sent an email to him on October 15,2003. Tr. (9121107) p. 854, L. 
19 - p. 855 L. 12; R. 392-405, Ex. 10090. 
12. Mr. Bistline finally responded to Vickie via a letter dated October 28, 2003. Tr. 
(9121107) p. 856 L. 7 -p. 857 L. 21; R. 392-405, Ex. 10094. He demanded that Prudential pay six 
hills referenced in his letter per the UM coverage. Id. However, he did not include copies of all of 
the bills, and did not provide any supporting medical records-i.e., showing that the bills were 
related to the accident. Id. Without supporting medical records, it would be impossible to evaluate a 
medical bill. See Tr. (9124107) p. 454, L. 24 - p. 455, L. 4. When Vickie spoke to Mr. Bistline on 
November 3,2003, they discussed what bills had been paid by MedPay (which were older, earlier 
billings), and Mr. Bistline instructed Vickie that he would be sending her a new medical 
authorization that would only allow her to request records from the MedPay unit. He said he would 
collect Sarah's medical records and forward them to Prudential, and he again demanded that 
Prudential pay the bills submitted that it was not disputing. Tr. (9121107) p.858 L. 8 - p. 861 L. 1. 
Vickie attempted to explain to Mr. Bistline that UM evaluated the whole claim based on all the 
information, but he insisted that Idaho law required piecemeal payment as bills were submitted. See 
Tr. (9121107) p. 861 L1.2-13. 
13. In response to Mr. Bistline's assertions about Idaho law, Vickie requested that Mr. 
Bistline send her legal authority supporting his assertion. Tr. (9121107) p. 861, L1. 17-22. She also 
consulted with her supervisors and contacted an Idaho attorney that did work for the company, all of 
whom were unfamiliar with any requirement to make multiple piecemeal payments. See Tr. 
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(9121107) p. 861 L. 25 -p. 863 L. 6. Mr. Bistline never responded with any legal authority to support 
his position. Tr. (9121107) p. 863, L1. 7-13. 
14. Mr. Bistline did not submit medical records to support Sarah's claims until April 
20,2004-some six months later. See Tr. (9121107) p. 869 L1. 1-15; R. 392-405, Ex. 101 17. Even 
then, however, the information was not complete, and Mr. Bistline indicated that he would be 
forwarding additional information. Id. However, because it can take a considerable amount of time 
to collect medical records from providers, Vickie was not surprised by the long delay. Tr. (9121107) 
p. 869 L1. 16-24. In any event, Vickie began reviewing those records while waiting for the additional 
records and legal authority that Mr. Bistline hadpromised. Tr. (9121107) p. 869 L. 25 -p. 870 L. 13. 
Mr. Bistline's demand for $16,669.64 was based on an attached spreadsheet, which itself contained 
gross errors: he claimed approximately $23,000 in past medical expenses, contending $6,600 had 
been paid by Prudential, with approximately $16,600 remaining. However, because of double 
counting expenses and other errors, the actual total medical expenses were $14,500, ofwhich $5,000 
had been paid under MedPay. Of the remaining $9,500, many of those amounts had been paid by the 
Weinsteins' health insurer. Tr. (9124107) p. 470 L. 12 - p. 471 L. 12. See also R. 150 (Plaintiffs' 
admission total medical bills were $14,500). Thus, the total amount unpaid by Prudential andlor 
Liberty was less than $10,000; and the outstanding amounts (i.e., unpaid by anyone) were much 
lower. 
15. On or about May 20,2004, Mr. Bistline sent more records, and a December 2003 file 
note from Sarah's orthopedic surgeon. Tr. (9121107) p. 870 L. 15 - p. 871 L. 9; R. 392-405, Ex. 
101 18. Mr. Bistline's assistant stated: "I am writing to inform you that our office is still working on 
updating records and bills since November 20,2003 and to provide you with information we have 
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received since Mr. Bistline's last correspondence of April 20." R. 392-405, Ex. 101 18. 
16. As previously noted, LM Property and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter, 
"Liberty") purchased Prudential in November 2003. Around June 7,2004, Vickie was transferred to 
a Liberty office and the Weinsteins' file was transferred to another adjuster, Dorothy Quinn 
(hereinafter, "Dorothy"). Tr. (9121107) p. 871 L. 11 - p. 873 L. 1. Dorothy was aware of the 
importance of reviewing the medical records to evaluate not only the severity of the injuries, but to 
also look for preexisting conditions or injuries, as well as subsequent accidents or events. Tr. 
(9124107) p. 452, L. 20 - p. 454 L. 18. In evaluating Sarah's medical records, Dorothy noted records 
indicating that after the accident, Sarah returned to playing soccer without problems. Tr. (9124107) p. 
465, L. 21 - p. 466, L. 1. Based on medical records that she received from Sarah's orthopedic 
surgeon, Dorothy was concerned that Sarah had aggravated her injuries by returning too quickly to 
playing soccer. Tr. (9124107) p. 468 L. 19 - p. 469 L. 8; R. 392-405, Ex. 10126. See also Tr. 
(9119107) p. 397 L. 15 - p. 398, L. 14 (Testimony of Dr. Shea acknowledging that something had 
happened between the time Sarah returned to soccer after the accident and when she was referred to 
him for treatment). In any event, because the Weinsteins had indicated that they were in dire 
financial straits, Dorothy came up with a plan to pre-pay the Weinsteins $10,000 based on Sarah's 
initial injury (Dorothy was still concerned there was an aggravation from a soccer injury). Tr. 
(9124107) p. 471 L. 17 - p. 472 L. 13. Dorothy obtained approval to make a $10,000 advance 
payment, Tr. (9124107) p. 473, L1. 20-23, and prepared an agreement providing for payment of 
$10,000 while reserving Liberty's right to continue evaluating the claim. R. 392-405, Ex. 10128; Tr. 
(9124107) p. 479 L. 19 - p. 482 L. 6. 
17. In a June 11,2004 letter to Mr. Bistline, Dorothy again noted that there was no legal 
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authority to support pre-payment of medical expenses and requested Mr. Bistline provide some. R. 
392-405, Ex. 10128. Notwithstanding, Dorothy indicated that Liberty was willing to make a $10,000 
prepayment, which would be issued when the enclosed form was completed and returned (generally 
referred to throughout the litigation as the Pay-in-Advance or PIA Agreement). Id. Also, as Plaintiffs 
had been advised so many times before, Dorothy wrote that "[wle will evaluate Ms Weinstein's 
damages when her medical treatment is completed or when you submit a settlement demand with all 
the medical documentation and proofs." Id. Finally, Dorothy asked Mr. Bistline to call with any 
questions. Id. 
18. Mr. Bistline's response to the offer to pre-pay $10,000 was to file suit. See R. 17 
(Complaint filed July 7, 2004). See also R. 392-405, Ex. 10130 (July 7, 2004 letter from Mr. 
Bistline). At this point, Mr. Bistline had not submitted any medical bills and records beyond 
November 2003; nor had he provided to Liberty information on future medical expenses or pain and 
suffering. Other than the erroneous spreadsheet submitted in April 2004, Mr. Bistline had not 
demanded a particular dollar amount. 
19. After the Weinsteins filed suit, Liberty continued to request and receive additional 
bills and records, see e.g., R. 392-405, Ex. 10134 and 10136, and, after evaluating the claim, Liberty 
paid all the past medical expenses (which payments were offset from Sarah's judgment). Even after 
suit, Plaintiffs never submitted to Liberty a demand and proof of Sarah's future medical expenses or 
general damages. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or New Trial because there was no breach of contract. 
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11. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or New Trial because the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie 
case of bad faith. 
111. Whether the court's award of punitive damages, even as remitted, is excessive and improper 
under Idaho law and federal due process standards. 
IV. Whether the court erred by giving or failing to give the jury instructions, to-wit: (a) 
instructing the jury as to the text of the Fair Practices Act; (b) failing to instruct the jury as to the 
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (c) failing the instruct the jury to disregard 
Norma Nielson's testimony; (d) instructing the jury as to valuing damages on a present cash value 
basis. 
V. Whether the court erred by awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff Sarah Weinstein pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 41-1839. 
VI. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' Motion for New Trial because ofjuror 
misconduct. 
VII. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or New Trial because of Plaintiffs' failure to mitigate their damages. 
VIII. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' motion for a mistrial or new trial for 
Plaintiffs having provided annotated exhibits lists to the jury. 
IX. Whether the court erred by not granting Defendants' Motion for a New Trial because: (a) 
there was a lack of evidence to support Plaintiffs' damages; and (b) by permitting the testimony of 
Norma Nielson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim as to the UM coverage is based on an assertion that Idaho 
law requires a UM carrier to pay a UM claim on a piecemeal basis as bills trickle in from the 
claimant, and that Defendants failed to comply. See Tr. (9/17/07), p. 58, L1. 5-24; Tr. (9/27/07), p. 
218, L1.2-6; Id. p. 224 L1. 12-19; Id. p. 228, L1. 15-22. This is the theory that the Court relied upon 
in instructing the jury. See Tr. (9/26/07), p. 80, L. 10 - p. 85, L. 24. However, there are two flaws 
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with Plaintiffs' theory of the case: (1) it is factually incorrect and (2) it is incorrect as a matter of 
law. 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached the policy by waiting until medical treatment had 
ceased and all bills and records collected before making payment. Nevertheless, although it was not 
the Defendants' standard practice, they attempted to make an advance payment after they had 
medical records to support the bills. Defendants tendered $10,000 after finally receiving bills and 
supporting medical records in April and May 2004. After Mr. Bistline rejected that offer and filed 
suit, Liberty still paid medical bills over the next several months and, in January 2005, made a 
payment of $67,000 (for a total of $80,000 paid under the UM coverage) as its estimate of Sarah's 
future medical expenses and general damages. Given this, it is clear that Plaintiffs' actual legal 
theory is that Plaintiffs should have been be able to forward a medical bill without supporting 
documentation and Defendants should have been required to pay it immediately. See, e.g., Tr. 
(9120/07) pp. 685-686. 
Plaintiffs' legal theory is also incorrect as a matter of law. First, "[iln insurance cases money 
becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract." Greenough v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589,593, 130 P.3d 1127,1131 (2006). The Policy provides: "Our 
payment is based on the amount that an insured is legally entitled to recover for bodily injury but 
could not collect from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle.. .." R. 187; R. 392-405, 
Exhibit 10000-27, Part 4,$ A (bold omitted; underline added). "Payment" is singular. "Amount" is 
singular. Nothing in the Policy supports multiple payments; the Policy refers to one "payment" and 
one "amount." Thus, there was no contractual duty to make multiple, piecemeal payments before the 
Company can evaluate the UM claim in its entirety. 
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Second, a single evaluation and payment of a UM claim is consistent with "the purpose of 
Idaho's uninsured motorist statute which is to afford the same protection to a person injured by an 
uninsured motorist as would have been enjoyed had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance." Ryals 
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 307, 1 P.3d 803, 808 (2000) (emphasis added). UM 
coverage is not intended to place the insured in a better position. Rudd v. Cal. Casualty Gen. Ins. 
Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 948,954,268 Cal. Rptr. 624,627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). If the uninsured driver 
had been insured, the Weinsteins would not have had the right to bring multiple, piecemeal suits 
against her or demand payment each time a medical expense was incurred. Rather, the Weinsteins 
would have been required to prove liability and legal causation for Sarah's damages (including 
medical expenses) in toto, and there would have been one settlement or payment based on the 
evidence as to the entirety of the claim. Requiring piecemeal payments from a UM insurer would 
place the insured in a better position than if dealing with an insured driver. 
Plaintiffs' argument also requires this Court to add new terms into the insurance contract. 
Puwis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005) ("the Court by 
construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the 
parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to 
either create or avoid liability."). See also SeeIdaho First Nut '1 Bankv.'Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 
Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991) (the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not add to or 
modify the terms of a contract). (Because of these admonitions, the court also erred by not giving 
Defendants' Requested Jury Instruction No. 21 indicated that the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing does not add new terms or duties to a contract). 
For the forgoing reasons, the court should have granted Defendants' motion for directed 
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verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and/or new trial. 
11. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF BAD FAITH. 
The court erred by not granting the Defendants' motions for directed verdict, new trial andlor 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiffs did not prove aprima facie case of bad 
faith. The plaintiff in a bad faith action bears the burden ofproof as to all elements oftheprima facie 
case. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173,177,45 P.3d 829,833 (2002). In 
order to prevail in a bad faith action against their own insurer, the plaintiff must show that the: (I)  
the insurer intentionally and unreasonable denied or withheld payment; (2) the claim was not fairly 
debatable; (3) that the denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith mistake; and (4) the 
resulting harm is not fully compensable by contract damages. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176. 
Obviously, there must also be an underlying breach of the contract. Treasure Valley Transit v. 
Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 925,929,88 P.3d 744,748 (2004). 
A. The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that the Delay in Payment Was 
Intentional or Unreasonable. 
"[Tlhe mere failure to immediately settle what later proves to be a valid claim does not of 
itself establish 'bad faith."' White v. UnigardMut. Ins. Go., 112 Idaho 94,100,730 P.2d 1014,1020 
(1986). "[EJven if an investigation could have been completed more expeditiously, there was no bad 
faith unless the company delayed, intending to 'achieve delay for delay's sake."' Roper v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 13 1 Idaho 459,462, 958 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1998). See also Greene v. 
TruckIns. Exchange, 114 Idaho 63,68,753 P.2d 274,279 (Ct. App. 1988). 
There is no evidence of "delay for delay's sake" on the part of Defendants. Any delay was 
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Bistline revoked all prior releases provided to Defendants, the only source of those records was 
through Plaintiffs. Mr. Bistline then took nearly 6 months to collect Sarah's medical records 
generated up through November 2003.~ Once Mr. Bistline started producing the records (it was not 
until April 20,2004 that Mr. Bistline sent any medical records, and not until after May 20,2004 that 
Liberty received all the records for the bills through November 2003), Dorothy Quinn quickly (i.e., 
June 11,2004) sent a letter to Plaintiffs' counsel offering a $10,000 prepayment. Together with the 
amount already paid by Defendants, this offer exceeded the sum total of all the medical bills 
submitted by Plaintiffs to Defendants. Thus, there is no evidence of a delay on the part of 
Defendants or that the delay was unreasonable. 
B. The Claims Were Fairly Debatable. 
"When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to dispute the claim and will not be 
deemed liable for failure to pay the claim." McGilvrey v. Farmers New World Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 
39,45,28 P.3d 380,386 (2001). An insurer is entitled to debate a fairly debatable claim whether the 
debate concerns a matter of fact or law. Id. "[Wlhen a claim involves a legal question of first 
impression, an insurer does not commit bad faith by litigating the claim even if the insurer does not 
prevail." Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). See also 
Squire v. Exchange Ins. Co., 116 Idaho 251,253,775 P.2d 143,145 (Ct. App. 1989) (same). 
7 Even Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Wadhams, was forced to acknowledge that in at least some cases medical 
records would be required to evaluate a medical bill. Tr. (9120107) p. 660 Ll. 17-21. Mr. Wadhams also acknowledged 
that if an insurer wants additional information, "I [i.e., the insured] have the obligation to supply it or at least give them 
authorization to go get it."Zd, p. 674, p. 674, LI. 21-25. Ewing "Buddy"Pau1, another insurance expert, testified ofthe 
need to obtain complete medical records in order to fully evaluate a claim. Revised Tr. (9125107) pp. 73-75. 
8 Even if Defendants had been able to order the records directly, however, there is no evidence that 
Defendants (whose offices were in Arizona) could have obtained the records from Sarah's medical providers (all of 
whom were in Boise, Idaho) any more quickly than Plaintiffs' attorney (who also was in Boise, Idaho). 
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, it was and is debatable--i.e., a 
"legal question of first impression3'-whether Defendants had an obligation to make multiple 
payments as bills were submitted rather than doing a single evaluation and payment. Defendants 
were unaware of any legal or contractual requirement to support Plaintiffs' demand for partial, 
piecemeal payments. Mr. Bistline was asked numerous times for legal authority, but never 
responded. While Plaintiffs argued at trial that there was a right to advance partial payments, none of 
the evidence showed that the issue was or is beyond debate. See, e.g., Tr. (9120107) pp. 597-598 
(Plaintiffs' expert on duty). Cf, e.g., Revised Tr. (9125107) p. 66 L1. 5-15 (if UM coverage was 
intended to pay individual medical bills, the policy language would be different); Id. p. 76 L. 18 - 24 
(company has to perform complete evaluation); Id. p. 76 L. 1 - p. 77 L. 12 (never seen demand for 
individual payment of bills); Id. p. 80 L1. 4-9 (matter of first impression in Idaho). 
Second, once Defendants received the medical records, a question arose as to whether Sarah 
may have reinjured or aggravated her injury. See R. 392-405, Exhibit 10127 (noting potential of 
reinjury by playing soccer). Dr. Weiss noted that Sarah had physical therapy aRer the accident and 
her symptoms (which led to her seeing Dr. Shea) arose afterward. Tr. (9124107) pp. 426-428. See 
also Tr. (9119107) p. 397 L. 15 -p. 398, L. 14 (Dr. Shea acknowledging same).He also testified that 
the tear to Sarah's labrum could have occurred before the car accident, or been a result of the 
accident or playing soccer. Id. p. 429 L. 23 - p. 430 L. 25. None of this was apparent until the 
Defendants had received the records from Mr. Bistline, and underscores that Defendant needed those 
records before paying the medical bills. 
Third, there was, and continues to be, a question of fact as to Sarah's future medical 
conditions, including whether Sarah will require a hip replacement due to the motor vehicle 
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collision. See R. 392-405, Exhibit 10136; Tr. (9119107) p. 435 L. 18 -p. 436 L. 3 (uncertain whether 
Sarah will need hip replacement). See also Tr. (9119107) pp. 420-423 and p. 432 (low risk for Sarah 
of arthritis in 2003, but now indicating higher risk of arthritis). Notably, Dr. Shea never testified 
that Sarah would actually need a hip replacement. See Tr. (9119107) p. 391, L1.9-18 (one possible 
scenario). Dr. Weiss even questioned whether Sarah currently had arthritis. Tr. (9124107) p. 425 L1. 
4-8. Although Dr. Weiss noted that Sarah had an increased chance of developing arthritis and 
requiring hip surgery, it was only a 1% greater chance (relative to the general population). Id. p. 435 
L1. 18-23. In short, neither medical experts said on either a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" 
or "more probable than not" basis that Sarah would need hip surgery; and the two doctors could not 
even agree whether Sarah was developing arthritis. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs never submitted a demand and proof for future medical expenses or Sarah's 
general damages, thus making those damages inherently debatable. 
In short, the legal and factual issues are and were debatable. Accordingly, the judgment of 
the court should be set aside. 
C. Any Mistakes Were Made in Good Faith. 
Plaintiffs fault Defendants for not having done a better job in getting Sarah's records. Yet 
Plaintiffs' counsel revoked Defendants' medical authorizations and promised to provide the records. 
If Defendants were mistaken in relying on the promise of Plaintiffs' counsel to provide the necessary 
records, such mistake was a good faith and honest mistake. There is no evidence Defendants had a 
bad motive or were indifferent to the Weinsteins in relying on Mr. Bistline to provide the records. 
During the time the UM claim was being evaluated, L.M. was assured by Mr. Bistline that he was preparing a 
proof of loss for her general damages and future medical care. See R 392-405, Exhibit 10117. That proof of loss was 
never provided. 
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Accordingly, there was no bad faith by the Defendants. 
D. The Plaintiffs' Harm was Fully Compensable Under Contract Damages. 
Finally, Plaintiffs must prove that the resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract 
damages. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 176. The only extra-contractual damages alleged or for which 
evidence was offered at trial were for Linda Weinstein's claimed emotional distress. 
Although not recoverable in a breach of contract action, mental anguish may be an element 
of damage in a bad faith claim. Klston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 21 1,218-19,923 
P.2d 456,463-64 (1996). In Walston, the court noted that in a claim for bad faith damages, there was 
the possibility of damages for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id., 129 Idaho 
at 219. However, it also held that a physical manifestation of injury is necessary for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Id. Since Plaintiffs never pled physical injury or physical 
manifestation, Mrs. Weinsteins' emotional distress claims are limited to intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
In Walston. the court stated that "an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will 
lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress." Id, 
129 Idaho at 219 (quoting Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct. App. 
1984)). Davis held that "evidence showing that the plaintiff was 'upset, embarrassed, angered, 
bothered and depressed' did not demonstrate a severely disabling emotional condition adequate for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress damages." Walston, 129 Idaho at 219 (quoting Davis, 106 
Idaho at 741). The court in Davis also indicated that "[lliability, however, only results when these 
reactions are so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Davis, 106 Idaho 
at 741. 
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Plaintiffs' only evidence of emotional distress was that Mrs. Weinstein suffered 
embarrassment and that, on occasion, she cried after speaking to bill collectors. See Tr. (9119107) p. 
537 L. 23 - p. 539 L. 9. She testified about calls in the Spring and Summer of 2003 that "caused 
[her] a lot of stress and a lot of grief." Id. p. 571 L1. 8-18. When prompted by her attorney, Mrs. 
Weinstein also indicated that the stress caused her to cry. Id. p. 571 L1. 19-20. She indicated that 
calls from creditors caused tension with her husband. Id. p. 572 L. 18 - p. 573 L. 3. She testified 
about one incident of embarrassment at Dr. Shea's office. Id. p. 576 L1. 17-25. 
Sarah testified her family was already having financial problems because of her father's 
business. Tr. (9119107), p. 537 L. 6 - p. 539, L. 9. When collection agencies called, her mother 
would cry and it caused turmoil. Id. Sarah also remembered the incident at Dr. Shea's office. Id. 
Mr. Weinstein did not testify. None ofthree family friends that Plaintiffs called as witnesses 
provided any testimony to support the claim of emotional distress. Judy Halverson wasn't aware of 
any financial problems. Tr. (9119107) p. 496, L1. 6-1 1. Nancy O'Conner disclaimed more than the 
barest knowledge of concerns over medical bills, stating that Mrs. Weinstein didn't talk about 
finances. Id., p. 51 1 L. 21 - p. 513 L. 16. Regardless, Sarah was not denied treatment by any health 
care providers over late payments. See Tr. (9119107) p. 437 L. 15 - p. 438 L. 6 (Dr. Shea); Tr. 
(9119107) p. 463 L. 25 - p. 464 L. 2 (physical therapist). 
Through July 3 1,2003, the medical bills were being paid by Plaintiffs' health insurance and 
the automobile MedPay coverage. It was barely a month later, on September 3, 2003, when Mrs. 
Weinstein contacted Vickie Kempczenski. The jury did not find any bad faith as to the claim 
handling of the MedPay coverage. Thus, the time period for analyzing Plaintiffs' bad faith claims for 
the UM coverage should be for events after September 3,2003, and no sooner than July 31,2003 
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ster made payment on nine (9) outstanding bills and MedPay coverage was 
exhausted. See R. 384, Ex. 72. While Sarah did not testify as to any time frame, Mrs. Weinstein's 
testimony limited her feelings of stress (and the crying) to Spring and Summer of 2003-i.e., during 
the time frame MedPay coverage was in effect. 
In addition, there is no evidence that Mrs. Weinstein "incurred any physical damage or [was] 
hampered in the performance of [her] daily functions, nor did [she] demonstrate that [she] suffered a 
severely disabling emotional response.. .." Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735,741,682 P.2d 1282,1288 
(Ct. App. 1984). Rather, she suffered from the same symptoms that the Davis court deemed 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 
id. Based on the foregoing, the court erred by not granting Defendants' motion for directed verdict 
or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The court also erred by not instructing the jury as to the elements required to prove the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress as requested by Defendants' Supplemental Jury 
Instruction No. 9. Finally, the court erred in not granting the motions for directed verdict, JNOV and 
new trial because the evidence and Plaintiffs' own admissions showed that the Plaintiffs had 
received hundreds of thousands of dollars that could have been used to pay the outstanding medical 
bills and forestall and mitigate their damages (including Mrs. Weinstein's alleged emotional 
distress), but did not do so." See Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,261,846 P.2d 
lo As noted previously, Plaintiffs' AprilMay 2004 demand only included bills throughNovember 2003. As of November 
2003, Sarah's total medical bills were approximately $14,500. $5,000 worth had previously been paid by MedPay. At 
least $6,500 had been paid by the Plaintiffs' health insurer, Midwest, leaving approximately $3,000 to be paid by 
Plaintiffs. See R 392-405, Ex. 10137 .See also Id., Ex. 10159 (as ofJune 11,2004, total bills were roughly $1 6,000, of 
which $4,222.63 bad not been paid by MedPay or Midwest). On September 30,2002, Plaintiffs sold a home with net 
proceeds of $175,000. See Tr.  (911707) p. 124, LI. 18-21; Tr. (9119107) p. 566, LI. 3-7. In December 2002, Plaintiffs 
sold another property in Florida (although Plaintiffs' counsel characterized it as a 103 1 exchange). Tr. (9117107) p. 124 
LI. 20-22. In February 2003, Mr. Weinstein inherited $290,000. Id p. 124 LI. 23-24. In March 2004, Mr. Weinstein 
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904,912 (1993). For these reasons, the judgment of the district court should he reversed. 
111. THE COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE UiWAIR CLAM 
SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, IDAHO CODE El 41-1329. 
The Court gave to the jury an instruction setting out the text of the Unfair Claim Settlement 
Practices Act, Idaho Code 5 41-1329. See R. 380A, Exhibit 37, InstructionNo. 37; Tr. (9127107) pp. 
202-204. While an expert may refer to the Act when testifying as to industry standards, see Inland 
Group of Cos. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,258,985 P.2d 674,683 (1999), there is 
no private cause of action for a violation of the Act. Simper v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 
471,475,974 P.2d 1100,1104 (1999); White v UnigardMut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94,101,730 P.2d 
The Court erred by giving this instruction. First, neither of Plaintiffs' purported insurance 
experts testified as to the Act or identified it as a source of industry standards. See generally Tr. 
(9120107) pp. 697-752 (Ms. Nielson); Id. pp. 588 - 687 (Mr. Wadhams). Second, even if an expert 
had testified that the Act represented an industry standard, the jury should have been free to reject 
such evidence. Accordingly, inclusion of the Act in the jury instruction (1) improperly created a 
private cause of action in that the jury was essentially instructed that violation of the Act justified 
imposition of liability; and (2) constituted an improper statement of law andor improper comment 
on the evidence by the judge by instructing the jury as to a standard of care. For this reason, the 
Court erred by failing to grant Defendants' motion for a new trial. 
inherited another $164,000. Id p. 124, LI. 24-25. Thus, during the time-frame that Plaintiffs have asserted they couldn't 
pay some $4,000 in medical bills, Plaintiffs had income of $629,000 from the sale of properties and inheritances alone. 
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IV. 
REVERSED. 
The jury's $6 million punitive damage award, even as remitted to $1.89 million, cannot stand. 
Both state and federal law proscribe excessive awards of this very sort. The court also erred in 
refusing to apply Idaho's statutory punitive damages cap, which took effect July 1,2003 and caps 
punitive damages at $250,000 or three times the compensatory damages and requires a higher 
standard of proof. The court also erred in (a) refusing to instruct the jury that the Plaintiffs must 
prove the elements of corporate ratification; (h) refusing to set aside the punitive damage award 
entirely because of the lack of evidence of unconscionable conduct; and (c) allowing Plaintiffs to 
amend to state a claim for punitive damages. This Court reviews de novo the applicability of the 
statutory cap and the court's handling of Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,507,95 P.3d 977,990-91 (2004), while 
reviewing for an abuse of discretion the court's decisions to permit the Plaintiffs to amend their 
Complaint and to deny Defendants a new trial, id. at 983,988. 
As a matter of federal law, the conduct of the trial and the excessiveness of the jury's punitive 
damage award fail to comport with due process. The court erred in allowing the jury to hear 
evidence of constitutionally improper factors that tainted the jury's punitive damages award, and 
then failed to salvage the trial by instructing the jury to calculate the punitive damages based only on 
actual or potential harm to Plaintiffs. Even the court's remittitur did not result in a constitutionally 
permissible punitive damage award - the court failed to reduce the punitive damage award to an 
amount less than or equal to the compensatory damages. This Court applies a de novo standard of 
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review when analyzing the propriety of a punitive damage award. See, e.g., Hall v. Farmers 
Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276,283 (2008). 
A. The court erred in refusing to apply Idaho's punitive damages cap and 
clear and convincing standard of proof, which took effect July 1,2003. 
For causes of action arising after July 1,2003, Idaho caps punitive damages at the greater of 
$250,000 or three times the compensatory damages. Idaho Code 3 6-1604(3); 2003 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, ch. 122, 3 6." Despite Defendants' repeated requests, the court refused to impose this 
statutory cap. See, e.g., Supp. R. at 76. This Court should reverse the trial court apply the statutory 
cap. 
A cause of action does not accrue until there are damages. See Nerco Minerals Co. v. 
Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144,150,90 P.3d 894,900 (2004); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 296,302-303,108 P.3d996,1002-1003 (2005); Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,616, 
850 P.2d 749, 767 (1993). According to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, there were no acts of bad faith 
relating to the UM coverage until after July 1,2003. See R. at 296 (noting that the Complaint "does 
not specify [bad faith] acts" before July 1,2003"); see also Tr. (412512007) at 122-23 (court noted 
that if it permitted the Plaintiffs to add MedPay claims they could seek punitive damages under the 
pre-amendment ~tatute). '~ More importantly, according to Plaintiffs' theory of the case, there were 
no damages stemming from those acts until bills were submitted for payment under the UM 
11 Idaho Code 5 6-1604(3) provides, "No judgment for punitive damages shall exceed the greater of two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or an amount which is three (3) times the compensatory damages contained in 
such judgment. If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not he informed of this limitation. The limitations on 
noneconomic damages contained in section 6-1603, Idaho Code, are not applicable to punitive damages." 
12 After the trial, the court attempted to explain away this statement, asserting "[tlhis comment was not 
meant to restrict the Weinsteins from presenting evidence at trial to alter" the court's opinion that the Complaint alleged 
no pre-July 1, 2003 acts of bad faith by the Defendants relating to the UM coverage. R. at 296. As explained furfher 
above, the court, without specifying how there was a bad faith breach of the UM contract before July 1,2003, summaily 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 24 
several bills to Defendants for payment. See supra, Statement of Facts 7 12. The cause of action on 
which the jury based its punitive damage award - the bad faith claim relating to the Weinsteins' 
uninsured motorist insurance - accrued after July 1,2003.'~ 
Nevertheless, the court misapplied the continuing tort doctrine to backdate the UM claim 
based on faulty reasoning that "the bad faith treatment of the Weinsteins' UM claim . . . began when 
Mrs. Weinstein reported the accident and provided Defendants with medical authorizations, " R. at 
296, and that "there are many reasons for applying the pre-July 2003 statute." R. at 296.14 None of 
the court's reasons supplant Plaintiffs' own Complaint, theory of the case, or the evidence admitted at 
trial.I5 The only evidence of breach of contract and bad faith for the UM coverage presented at trial 
related to events from September 2003 and later. See supra, Statement of Facts 77 9-17. Therefore, 
the cause of action giving rise to the punitive damages award accrued after the statutory cap had 
taken effect. Moreover, because the amended version of 3 6-1604 controls, the District Court erred 
in not instructing the jury that punitive damages had to be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, as requested by Defendants' Supplemental Jury InstructionNo. 14. See I.C. 3 6-1604(1) 
stated that "[alfter hearing the evidence in its entirety" the "pre-amendment statute applied to the UMportion of the claim 
as well." Id. 
I3 The j u ~ y  found that there was no bad faith as to the MedPay claim. See R.A.11 at 218 (Special Verdict 
form). Therefore, this Court's analysis must he based on when the bad-faith claim with respect to the UM coverage 
accrued. 
14 Having already pinpointed the time at which the continuing tort began, the court's statement is 
especially odd. In fact, the court had earlier concluded that the "cause of action in this case accrued at the time of the 
accident . . . . So the law of punitive damages at that time is what applies to this case." Tr. (Sept. 27,2007) at 129. As 
explained above, neither of the court's "pinpointed" times is a fair or realistic assessment of when t h e m  had faith cause 
of action accrued. 
IS The court's confusion is also apparent from its statement that "Defendants were on notice in 2002 that 
bad faith handling of the claim could result in punitive damages for which there was no cap in Idaho," R. at 297 (Jan. 1, 
2008 order denying new trial at 11). Such notice has nothing to do with when the claim accrued. 
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the elements of corporate ratification. 
Idaho law is clear that "[tlo recover punitive damages against a corporation, one must show 
that an officer or director participated in, or ratified, the conduct underlying the punitive damage 
award." G r g  Inc. v. Curvy Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315,321,63 P.3d441,447 (2003). To authorizeor 
ratify the malicious act of a lower-level employee, the officer or director must "at the time of such 
ratification [have] knowledge of all the material facts." Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 
Idaho 47, 54, 830 P.2d 1185, 1192 (1992) (quotation omitted). 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence showing ratification, let alone knowledge, by officers and 
directors of any of the Defendant corporations. Plaintiffs' evidence instead pointed to acts performed 
by adjusters or their immediate supervisors. If there was actionable conduct in failing to timely order 
records or follow up with Plaintiffs' counsel, such conduct was by an adjuster. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the form of the pay-in-advance agreement, or its use under these circumstances, were 
reviewed or ratified by an officer or director of any of the Defendant corporations. 
The court excused its failure to instruct the jury on this prerequisite to a punitive damages 
award by stating "sufficient evidence of authorization exists to justify the recovery of punitive 
damages against the corporation." R. at 324. Yet that was a question for the jury that it had no 
opportunity to decide because the court failed to instruct on Idaho law. The court erred in denying 
Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the award of punitive damages. 
This Court should therefore set aside the entire punitive damage award. 
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C. The court erred in refusing to set aside the punitive damage award entirely 
because of the lack of evidence of unconscionable conduct 
Even if the punitive damages claim was permissibly added, this Court must set aside the 
punitive damage award because there is insufficient evidence of unconscionable conduct to justify 
the award. Gr$ Inc., 63 P.3d at 446 (punitive awards not favored; require compelling 
circumstances) The amended version of Idaho Code 5 6-1604(1) required Plaintiffs to "prove, by 
clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party 
against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted." 
Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the Defendants 
faced a novel UM benefits claim, in which the Weinsteins sought piecemeal payments. The 
Defendants deliberated about the Weinsteins' claim and reached a good faith determination based on 
their reasonable questions regarding Sarah Weinstein's possible preconditions and the severity of her 
hip injury. Because the legal standard with respect to payment of UM benefits is so opaque, the 
Plaintiffs simply could not - and did not - adduce sufficient evidence to prove "by clear and 
convincing evidence" that Defendants acted oppressively or outrageously.'G This Court must vacate 
the punitive damage award. 
D. The court erred in allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to 
add punitive damage claims. 
The court abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to cure certain 
defects in their pleadings (i.e., limiting their cause of action to events after September 3, 2003) 
during the summary judgment hearing, and after the deadline set by the court for amended pleadings. 
16 Even under the pre-amended statute's "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the Plaintiffs failed to 
justify the imposition of punitive damages. As explained above, Defendants were charting new territory with this claims 
process. 
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court abused its discretion by "disregard[ing] its own deadline [and] allowing the untimely 
submission" of a memorandum detailing attorney fees and costs. This Court concluded that the trial 
court's decision was "unfair to the parties." Id. So too, here, it was unfair to Defendants to permit 
the Plaintiffs lo move for and amend their complaint to broaden their claims and factual allegations 
after the deadline for amendments had passed. Allowing Plaintiffs to argue for punitive damages at 
trial changed the character of the trial and prejudiced Defendants as a result. 
E. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the jury's 
excessive punitive damage award, even as remitted by the trial court. 
The trial court committed two critical errors that resulted in an award of punitive damages 
that violates due process. First, the court allowed Plaintiffs to present constitutionally improper 
evidence and argument to the jury, despite the Defendants' objections. The court then failed to 
mitigate its earlier errors with a clear jury instruction. Second, after the jury entered its verdict, the 
court failed to reduce the jury's excessive punitive damage award to a constitutionally permissible 
sum. This Court applies a de novo standard of review when analyzing the constitutional propriety of 
a punitive damage award. See, e.g., Hall, 179 P.3d at 283. 
1. U.S. Supreme Court precedents forbid punitive damage awards 
based on constitutionally improper factors 
Trial courts must take steps to ensure that juries do not base punitive damage awards on 
alleged harm to non-parties or on biases stemming from the net worth of the Defendants. Here, the 
court took no such steps and actually allowed Plaintiffs to present constitutionally improper 
evidence and argument. As a result, the punitive damage award here is unconstitutional. 
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of potential harm to others. 
A jury's award of punitive damages must be limited to the discrete harm actually, or 
potentially, caused the party-plaintiff. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,354,127 S. Ct. 
1057, 166 L. Ed. 2d 940 (2007) ("Philip Morris"). Due process "forbids a State to use a punitive 
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties," including any 
potential harm to others, id. at 353; the "potential harm at issue [is] harm potentially caused the 
plaintiff;" id. at 354 (emphasis in original). Actual (not potential) injury to nonparties can be used to 
demonstrate reprehensibility - i.e., that punitive damages should be awarded - but "a jury may not 
go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of 
harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties," Id, at 355, because "permit[ing] punishment for 
injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages 
equation." Id. at 354. 
Accordingly, "the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not 
asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish 
for harm caused strangers." Id. at 355; see also Merrickv. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 1007, 
1017 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing punitive award because jury instructions failed to "prevent the jury 
from setting an amount of damages that includes direct punishment for harm to others"). Where the 
evidence or argument at trial create a significant risk that the jury will use information regarding 
alleged injuries to non-parties to punish a defendant, the court must provide the defendant some form 
of protection. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355; see also Merrick, 500 F.3d at 1016. 
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court must vac 
award. See, e.g., Merrick, 500 F.3d at 1016-18. In Merrick, the plaintiff introduced expert evidence 
regarding the defendant's policies and practices, repeatedly raised the specter of the defendant's 
unethical behavior, and asked how the jury could punish a company that was terminating roughly 
$132 million in coverage each quarter. 500 F.3d at 1016. Because the court failed to guide the jury 
properly to prevent the due process dangers identified in Philip Morris, the Ninth Circuit overturned 
the award of punitive damages. Id. at 1018. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs focused the jury's attention on potential injuries that the Defendants 
and the entire insurance industry might someday inflict on other insureds. Plaintiffs didnot have any 
evidence of actual (as opposed to potential) harm to others from Defendants' challenged actions - the 
type of evidence that might be proper for the limited purpose of determining reprehensibility. 
Despite a standing objection from Defendants, Tr. (9117107) at 23-24, Plaintiffs' counsel made 
references to the insurance industry as a whole (outside of Idaho) throughout each stage of the trial, 
see e.g., Revised Tr. (9125107) at 45-46. In opening, Plaintiffs' counsel argued to the jury that the 
"insurance industry is an extremely important industry to Idahoans, and to Americans," Tr. (9117107) 
at 25, that there are thousands of insurance companies, id. at 26, that the fifty state insurance 
commissioners fail to police insurance companies' claims practices, and that only juries can regulate 
these companies, id. at 126-28. Thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel continued to blur the line between 
insurance companies operating in Idaho and the nationwide insurance industry throughout the trial. 
See, e.g., Tr. (9120107) at 71 1-12,717,721." In closing, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the punitive 
17 Plaintiffs' expert, Norma Nielson, testified over Defendants' objection, Tr. (9120107) at 712, as to the 
insurance industry on a nationwide basis, and was unable to provide information on the effectiveness of Idaho's 
Department of Insurance in regulating insurance companies, id at 750. 
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damages have nothing to do with compensating his clients, but were awarded to discipline the 
Defendants and other insurance companies. Tr. (9127107) at 258." This was a patent invitation to 
calculate the amount of punitive damages based on potential harm to others. Similarly, in his rebuttal 
on closing, Plaintiffs counsel told the jury that their most important task was to influence the 
insurance industry for a long period of time. Id. at 365. 
At trial, Plaintiffs offered no evidence of actual harm to non-parties. Rather, to incite the jury 
to award disproportionate punitive damages, Plaintiffs raised the specter that others would suffer at 
the hands of Defendants or other insurance companies in a way similar to Plaintiffs. The court erred 
in allowing the Plaintiffs to pursue this line of argument concerningpotential harm to non-parties. 
b. The court erred by refusing to give Defendants' proposed 
punitive damages instructions. 
Defendants attempted to limit the harm caused by the Plaintiffs' improper evidence and 
argument by proffering jury instructions that would "cabin" the jury's discretion and discourage it 
from considering constitutionally improper factors. See Tr. (9127107) at 138, 149. But the Court 
refused to give Defendants' proposed punitive damage instruction and opted instead for 
constitutionally deficient instructions. See id. at 200-02 (Instructions Nos. 33 through 37). 
In denying Defendants' motion for new trial, the court asserted that Instruction No. 36 
"exceeded the requirements of Phillip Morris [sic]." R. at 321. The court's rationale was that Philip 
Morris allows the jury to consider harm to non-parties when determining the reprehensibility of 
defendants' conduct, and the court had given no instruction telling the jury to consider harm to non- 
18 Plaintiffs' counsel did argue that punitive damages were to "Deter [Defendants] and any other insurance 
company that's operating in this state from doing this sort of thing in the future." Tr. (9127107) at 257. And he referred to 
"in Idaho" or "in this state" in some comments regarding insurance companies. But those statements still impermissibly 
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parties. Id. Thus, the court concluded Defendants' second supplemental instructions "were 
sufficiently covered." Id. 
But the trial court misapplied Philip Morris. It apparently believed that even though 
Plaintiffs had presented evidence and argument of potential (not actual) harm to others, it did not 
need to give the jury special instructions to prevent the jury from considering that harm in its 
punitive damages calculation. The court mistakenly believed that the jury properly could consider 
evidence of potential harm to non-parties "as it relates to the reprehensibility prong." R. at 321. The 
court believed it was sufficient to say nothing about how harm to non-parties could be considered for 
reprehensibility. R. at 321 ("This Court gave no instruction to the jury telling them to consider harm 
to non-parties as it relates to the reprehensibility prong."). 
While Philip Morris permits the jury to consider potential harm to the plaintiff under the 
rubric of reprehensibility, it prohibits the jury from considering evidence of potential harm to non- 
parties. 549 U.S. at 354. Plaintiffs nevertheless encouraged the jury to penalize Defendants in order 
to "punish" or "deter" non-parties (other insurance companies) for the harms they have visited on 
non-parties. And the court failed to prevent the Plaintiffs from muddying the waters. The court's 
approach left the jury confused, rather than guided, about the role of evidence of harm to non- 
parties. Evidence of that conhsion is the jury's $6 million punitive damage award - an amount that 
even the court recognized was too large. Indeed, Instruction No. 36 told the jury that punitive 
damages could not be assessed to punish Defendants for injury to non-parties. Tr. (9127107) at 201- 
02. That left the jury with no guidance about why it was hearing evidence and argument about non- 
invited the jury to calculate punitive damages based on potential harm to others, even if the others were just in Idaho 
instead of all over the United States. They do not mitigate the due process violation. 
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direct punishment for nonparty harm runs afoul" of Philip Morris). 
The trial court erred in failing to take constitutionally mandated steps to prevent jurors from 
awarding an arbitrary amount in punitive damages based on potential harm to non-parties. Thus, the 
punitive damage award should be reversed. 
e. The Supreme Court's recent punitive damage precedents 
forbid evidence of harm to persons in other jurisdictions. 
Because punitive damages may only be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests, "a 
State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the 
tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States." BMWofN. Am., Znc. v. Gore, 5 17 U.S. 559,572,116 S. 
Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996) ("Gore"); Bodenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,363,98 S. Ct. 
663,54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). Thus, "[a] jury must be instructed .. . that it may not use evidence of 
out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it 
occurred." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,422, 123 S. Ct. 1513,155 L. 
Ed. 2d 585 (2003) ("Campbell"). Similarly, punitive damages cannot be awarded to punish the 
perceived deficiencies of a company's operations throughout the country. Campbell, 583 U.S. at 420- 
21. Punitive damages may not be based a defendant's independent, dissimilar acts. A defendant 
should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or 
business. Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate 
the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the 
reprehensibility analysis. Id. at 423. 
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ut harm to others 
outside Idaho. Contrary to the court's analysis, see R. at 299, Plaintiffs' counsel's requests that the 
jury punish the insurance industry were not clearly limited to Idaho. See, e.g., Tr. (9120107) at 71 1- 
12, 717, 721.19 More specifically, Dr. Nielson did not limit her testimony to Idaho and instead 
discussed the insurance industry as a whole. The fact that Dr. Nielson testified "she had no 
knowledge of the Weinsteins' claim or how it was handled" and her testimony only related "to how 
insurance works and why it exists," R. at 299, does not justify her invitation to have the jury 
consider and punish out-of-state insurance company conduct. For these reasons, the District Court 
also erred by allowing Ms. Nielson to testify and not giving Defendants' requested Supplemental 
Jury Instruction No. 13 (instructing the jury to disregard her testimony). 
d. Campbell forbids consideration of the Defendants' net 
worth. 
Plaintiffs presented evidence about the Defendants' net worth, and the court instructed the 
jury to consider this information as part of the punitive damages inquiry. This violated Defendants' 
Due Process rights by encouraging the jury to base its punitive damage award not on the Defendants' 
actual conduct in this case, but rather on their net worth. 
Juries may not impose punitive damages based on evidence of a defendant's wealth. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417. The U.S. Supreme Court has "admonished that 'punitive damages pose 
an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property."' Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,432 (1994)). Because "~]uryinstructions typically leave the jury 
with wide discretion in choosing amounts, . . . the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net 
worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big 
19 See supra note 18. 
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Court expressly rejected the Utah Supreme Court's effort to "justify the massive award by pointing 
to . . . State Farm's enormous wealth" and its "assets." Id. at 426,427. Rather, the Court held that the 
defendant's wealth and assets "bear no relation to the award's reasonableness or proportionality to 
the harm," and therefore "cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award." Id. 
at 427." Even though Utah law had traditionally looked to the defendant's financial status as a factor 
in calculating punitive damages, the Court held that "the reference to [defendant's] assets .. . had 
little to do with the actual harm sustained by the [plaintiffs]" and could not be used to support the 
punitive damages award. Id.; see also Cooperlndus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424,442 (2001) (punitive damages award cannot rest on a company's overall revenues or profits, but 
must, at the very least, be tied to the profits generated by the misconduct at issue). 
Here, Plaintiffs offered argument and evidence concerning Liberty Mutual's net worth 
repeatedly during the trial. See, e.g., Tr. (9117107) at 128; Tr. (9120107) at 723-24; Revised Tr. 
(9125107) at 48-49; Tr. (9127107) at 258-59,263-66. For example, in cross-examining the Defendants' 
expert, David Childers, Plaintiffs' counsel commented that Liberty Mutual is a $7.9 billion net 
company with $26 billion in gross income. Revised Tr. (9/25/07) at 48. Plaintiffs' counsel then 
volunteered that if the insurance commissioner levied a $10,000 fine against a $7.9 billion company 
it would be akin to a $100,000 company paying 12.5 cents. Id. at 49. When Childers testified that 
such fines do, in fact, have an effect on insurance companies, Plaintiffs' counsel suggested that a 
company would "giggle about" such a fine and editorialized that such a fine "wouldn't even pay the 
country club dues for one of their [directors]." Id. Despite the Plaintiffs' clear intent to invoke the 
20 As explained below, this award - even as remitted - is unconstitutionally excessive. 
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jury's biases, the court nonetheless instructed the jury in Instruction No. 35 that it could consider 
Defendants' wealth and financial condition in determining punitive damages. Tr. (9127107) at 201. 
The court justified this instruction because the language was taken from IDJI 9.20.5. R. at 320. 
There was no proper reason for the jury to hear about Defendants' net worth. The court's 
rationale - that Campbell does not absolutely forbid such evidence as long as the punitive damage 
award is not based "on a defendant's wealth alone," R. at 299 - represents a strained reading of 
Campbell. In supporting its reading of Campbell, the court asserted that "Defendants' wealth was 
relevant to determining the size of the award necessary to deter Defendants, and others similarly 
situated, from engaging in similar conduct in the future." R. at 300-01 (citing Myers, 95 P.3d at 988). 
This statement reveals the error in the court's analysis. If the jury was calculating the amount of 
damages based on Defendants' net worth, it was not considering proper factors such as the actual or 
potential harm to the plaintiffs (and not others). To the extent this Court's decision in Myers holds 
otherwise, it must be overruled in light of the recent Supreme Court precedents noted above. 
Moreover, the court's analysis ignores the Campbell Court's warning that presentation of evidence 
about a defendant business's net worth may stoke a jury's bias against large businesses. The 
Plaintiffs' unchecked use of constitutionally improper evidence about the Defendants' net worth 
warrants a new trial. 
2. The court erred in failing to reduce the punitive damages to an 
amount less than or equal to the compensatory damages. 
The Supreme Court's Due Process jurisprudence makes clear that a trial court must regulate 
not only the jury's process of arriving at a punitive damage award but also the result. Here, a deeply 
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excessive award to an appropriate amount. This Court must now reduce the punitive damage award. 
Punitive damages are meant to punish and deter. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 (noting punitive 
aspects of non-economic damages). They must bear some reasonable relationship to the conduct 
being punished and should only be awarded if the compensatory damages standing alone are 
insufficient to punish and deter the conduct. Id. at 419. The Due Process Clause "prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor." Id. at 416. 
In determining whether a particular punitive damage award comports with due process, the 
court is to consider three guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 
punitive damage award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury 
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; see 
generally Hall, 179 P.3d at 283-87 (applying these three guideposts from Campbell; and affirming 
reduction of excessive punitive damages to four times actual damages). 
a. Plaintiffs did not present any evidence of reprehensible 
conduct by the Defendants. 
The trial court's reprehensibility analysis, see R. at 301-02, ignores ample evidence that the 
Defendants acted reasonably and in good faith, despite the mistakes they admittedly made. 
The Campbell Court directed trial courts to consider whether: 
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced 
an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health and safety of others; the target 
of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or 
was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, 
or deceit, or mere accident. 
538 U.S. at 419. 
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economic, not physical. CJ: Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., No. 06-3666,2008 WL 537801 I, at 
*9 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2008) (holding that "embarrassment in the community" does not "constitute 
physical harm"). The tortious conduct did not evince an indifference to the health or safety of the 
plaintiffs - rather, it evinced the Defendants' uncertainty about how to process a novel claim for 
piecemeal UM insurance payments. And the Defendants' conduct was a one-off response to a novel 
claim for payment. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 577-79 (recidivist conduct considered in relation to non- 
parties, not to plaintiffs); Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Sew. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 
2005) (concluding, in case involving insurance company's "stonewalling" of insured, that evidence 
of defendant's conduct in a single case has "less force" in demonstrating recidivism than a pattern of 
conduct towards other parties). 
Both the $6 million punitive damage award, and the remitted amount of $1.89 million, are 
excessive considering (a) the efforts that Defendants made to get some money to Plaintiffs once the 
medical records were received, and (b) the fact that this was the first request for advance partial 
payments that any of the adjusters had ever received. The testimony of Defendants' insurance expert, 
Professor Buddy Paul, explained how such payments are not consistent with how UM coverage is 
normally administered. See Revised Tr. (9125107) pp. 78-80. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of 
reprehensibility to support any punitive damage award. See, e.g., Broussard v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 627-30 (5th Cir. 2008) (reversing $2.5 million punitive damages award 
against because insurer cannot be liable for punitive damages solely for relying on legally valid and 
enforceable clause in insurance contract); Hall, 179 P.3d at 286 (insurer's lies and two-year delay 
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times the ratio that 'might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety."'). 
b. The disparity between the punitive damage award and the 
compensatory damages violates due process. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive 
damage award cannot exceed, it has advised "that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (noting prior cases where the Court had 
held ratio of 4: 1 was close to the line, but was not unconstitutional). More recently, in Ewon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, - U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633, 171 L.Ed. 2d 570 (2008) ("Ewon 
Shipping"), the Court applied federal maritime law and held that punitive damages may not exceed a 
1:l ratio in that conte~t .~ '  
The 1: 1 ratio adopted in Ewon Shipping is consistent with other recent cases where courts 
have reduced punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 
F.3d 36,54-55 (1st Cir. Feb. 24,2009) (affirming district court's reduction of punitive damage award 
to $35,000 from $350,000, resulting in 1: 1 ratio); Jurinko, 2008 WL 537801 1, at "1 1; Bach v. First 
Union Nut? Bank, 486 F.3d 150, 156-157 (6th Cir. 2007) (reducing $2.2 million punitive damage 
award to $400,000, resulting in 1: 1 ratio); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790,798-799 
(8th Cir. 2004) (reducing $6 million punitive damage award to $600,000 resulting in 1 : 1 ratio); cf: 
21 The Supreme Court's one-line order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted in Williams, see No. 
07-1216,129 S.Ct. 1436 (Mar. 31,2009), does not alter the evident trend towards a 1:l ratio. The Williams order should 
be read in light of the Oregon Supreme Court's clear statement that Philip Moms was procedurally barred 'om 
challenging the punitive damage jury instruction. See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc,, 176 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Or. 2008). 
Because the Oregon Supreme Court decided the matter on this independent point of state law, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had no available course of action to remedy the excessive award. 
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6, 2008) (affirming reduction of punitive damages award $3 million, resulting in a 1.5:1 ratio 
"consistent with the constitutional framework as described in Exxon"). Such a ratio is particularly 
appropriate where the compensatory damages are substantial. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. 
Here, the jury awarded $210,000 for alleged emotional distress to Mr. and Mrs. Weinstein - 
on top of the $250,000 in breach of contract damages (policy limits) awarded to Sarah Weinstein - 
because Mrs. Weinstein was "deeply disturbed by the harassment of hill collectors and Defendants' 
unresponsiveness to her pleas for assistance." See R. at 290,3 11-12 (1123108 new trial order). Thus, 
the compensatory damages in this case provide substantial compensation to Sarah Weinstein (for 
fUture medical coverage) and Mrs. Weinstein (for emotional distress). Any punitive damage award 
goes above and beyond such damages. 
The jury's punitive damage award of $6 million, on top of the emotional distress damages, 
was 28.5 times those compensatory damages - an amount even the trial court had to concede was 
excessive. The court remitted the amount of punitive damages to $1.89 million (nine times the 
compensatory damages) in a conditional order that Plaintiffs challenge on this appeal. R. at 304-05. 
But the court erred in reducing the punitive damages to only nine times the compensatory damages. 
The conduct at issue here, combined with the large emotional distress damage award to Mr. andMrs. 
Weinstein, does not justify an award higher than the 1: 1 ratio reflected in the Exxon Shipping case 
and other recent cases." 
22 Of course, this case does not involve the situation of nominal damages presented in Myers. See 95 
P.3d at 992 ("It should be observed that ratios of compensatory damages and punitive damages are of no real assistance. 
. . where only nominal damages are sought."). Regardless, Idaho courts do not have discretion to ignore the federal 
constitutional dictates of the Gore and Campbell decisions. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 40 
c. The punitive damages award here, even as remitted, 
vastly exceeds the civil penalty for comparable conduct. 
Applying a 1:l ratio here would result in an award somewhat more comparable to the 
maximum statutory penalty for the wrongful conduct at issue. "[A] reviewing court engaged in 
determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should accord substantial deference 
to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue." Gore, 517 U.S. 
at 583. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that punitive damages greatly in excess of a 
civil penalty for similar misconduct may violate the defendant's due process rights. See Campbell, 
538 U.S. at 429 (punitive damages of $145 million excessive when maximum civil penalty would 
have been $10,000); Gore, 517 U.S. at 583-84 (punitive damage award of $2 million excessive when 
compared to maximum civil penalty of $2,000). 
The maximum penalty for violation of the Idaho Unfair Claims Practices Act is $10,000. See 
Idaho Code § 41-132912. Thus, the original punitive damage award in this case is 600 times the 
maximum statutory penalty; even the remitted award is 189 times that maximum penalty. Under 
Gore and Campbell, this punitive damages award is unconstitutional and must be reduced. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The district court awarded $89,840.19 in attorney's fees to Sarah Weinstein pursuant to 
Idaho Code $ 41-1839. See R. 268. To trigger attorney's fees under this section, the insured must 
first provide a proof of loss. See LC. $41-1839(1). The purpose of a proof of loss "is to allow the 
insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for 
investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it." Brinkman v. AidIns. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 
349-50,766 P.2d 1227,1230-3 1 (1988). A proof of loss must include a demand for a specific sum. 
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See Associates Discount Corp. v. Yose 
(1974); Carter v. Cascade Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136,438 P.2d 566 (1968). 
The jury award to Sarah covered future medical expenses and general damages because 
Defendants had already paid approximately $80,000 to Sarah which included all past medical 
expenses. Even if Plaintiffs' April and May 2004 proof and demand constituted a proof of loss, it 
was only for medical expenses through November 2003. Plaintiffs never submitted a proof of loss 
for Sarah's future medical expenses or general damages. Because 5 41-1839 was never triggered by 
submission of a proof of loss, Sarah is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
VI. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
ON JUROR MISCONDUCT. 
Potential jurors were questioned during voir dire whether they were policyholders of any of 
the defendant insurance companies and dismissed for cause if they answered in the affirmative. See 
R. 380B, Exhibit 39; Tr. (1 1/19/07) p. 388, L1.8-14. ARer the trial, Defendants discovered that one 
jurors, Mark Barbo, was a Liberty Mutual policy-holder. See R. 380B, Ex. 39. See also Tr. 
(1 1/19/07) p. 379 Ll. 6-1 1. Moreover, Mr. Barbo had made a collision claim against his policy in 
December 2004 which claim was denied. See R. 380B, Ex. 43; R. 380C, Ex. 54,58 and 59. Mr. 
Barbo and his wife had been in contact with Liberty Mutual fiReen times, of which at least six (6) 
contacts were with Mr. Barbo. See R. 380C, Ex. 58,16 and Exhibit 1. See also R. 380C, Ex. 59, 
Exhibit A (transcript of interview of Mr. Barbo relating to a 2004 automobile collision). 
In McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1983), the court held that a 
new trial was proper where a party is able to "demonstrate that a juror failed to [I] answer honestly 
[2] a material question on voir dire, and then [3] W h e r  show that a correct response would have 
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provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Id., 464 U.S. at 556. The foregoing was adopted by 
this Court in State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899,902,828 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1992). 
Elements (1) and (3) are clearly established-Mr. Barbo failed to honestly answer a question 
and, later, failed to reveal to the Court that his answer had not been correct. Because Mr. Barbo was 
aware that others potential jurors that had disclosed that they were policyholders were dismissed, he 
should have been aware of its importance. See Tr. (1 1119107) p. 388, L1.8-14. That apositive answer 
would have provided a challenge for cause is uncontroverted in this case because all other 
policyholders were dismissed. 
Plaintiffs counsel told the jurors in his opening statement that their decision would dictate 
claim-handling procedures by insurance companies in general, and that they would be able to 
"discipline" defendants in particular. Tr. (9117107) p. 24 Ll. 15-17; p. 128 L. 23. Thus, Mr. Barbo 
had a real opportunity to change for his benefit the way &s insurance company operated; or to 
"discipline" it for denying his 2004 collision claim. Thus, per element 2, the question was material 
as to Mr. Barbo's actual or potential bias, and the trial court should have granted a new trial. 
VI1. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RIOTION FOR KEW 
TRIAL BECAL'SE PLAINTIFFS HAD PROVI1)ED ANNOTATED EXHIBIT LISTS 
TO THE JURY. 
Rule 59 provides for a new trial due to "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l). On September 18,2007, Plaintiffs' counsel distributed 
exhibit notebooks to the jury while Defense counsel was involved with a side-bar discussion with 
the judge, see Tr. (911812007) pp. 238-239, stating only that the notebooks had "the same exhibit list 
and chronology that the Court has," without any mention that there were annotations. Id. p. 238 L. 
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which they'd had for some four days, contained an exhibit list annotated with commentary and 
argument by Plaintiffs' counsel---comparable to counsel communicating ex parte with the jury. 
Defendants' counsel discovered the juror's had the list only after seeing a juror making notes on one. 
The district court abused its discretion by not ordering a mistrial at that point, and should have 
granted Defendants' motion for a new trial on this basis. 
F7111. PI.AINTIFFS' DAMAGES WERE UNSL'PPOItTEI) BY ?'HE EF'IDEZICE AND/OR 
THE DAMAGE AWARDS WERE EXCESSIVE. 
Rule 59 provides for a new trial where there are "[e]xcessive damages . . . appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). This court has also held 
that "[c]ompensatory awards based on speculation and conjecture will not be allowed." Horner v. 
Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,141 P.3d 1099,1106 (2006). Rather, "damages must be proved with 
reasonable certainty and cannot be based on mere speculation." Id. 
Sarah's damage award was based on a minimal impairment and possible need for future hip 
replacement surgery. Neither Dr. Shea and Dr. Weiss that hip replacement surgery would he needed. 
No testimony was given as to the costs of those types oftreatment. Thus, it was purely speculative as 
to whether the surgery would be required. Nevertheless, the jury was asked by Plaintiffs' counsel to 
award policy limits of $250,000 and did so. 
Similarly, the jury awarded $210,000 to Linda and Leslie Weinstein solely based on Mrs. 
Weinstein's alleged emotional distress. As already noted, the evidence was insufficient as a matter 
of law to support a claim of intentional emotional distress. 
Finally, the jury had awarded $6 million in punitive damages. As already thoroughly briefed, 
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statements to the jury that their decision would serve to regulate the insurance industry, and was 
unsupported by any actual evidence of bad faith. Obviously, such awards based on such scanty 
evidence was the product of passion or prejudice, and unsupported by the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the judgments of the District Court. 
-+ 
DATED this day of April, 2009. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 45 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this$z%ay of April, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF APPEAL by delivering the same 
to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as 
follows: 
R. John Iasinger L U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
GOSS GUSTAVEL GOSS, PLLC [ d Hand-Delivered 
401 W. Front Street, Ste. 302 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 [ 1 Facsimile 
Jason Risch 
Risch Pisca, LLC 
407 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[/J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile , 
- 
Robert A. Anderson 
APPELLATE BRIEF - 46 
